In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, and rationalist (...) constructivist. I argue that Kant is best seen as a rationalist constructivist. I conclude by arguing that although it’s a constructivist view, this reading avoids the main pitfalls of traditional Kantian constructivism. In doing so, it helps us to achieve a satisfying rapprochement between constructivist and non-constructivist readings of Kant. (shrink)

What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s Formula (...) of Humanity. Lastly, I discuss the overall merits of what I call ‘Kantian moral love’. I argue that while Kantian moral love might rightly identify, from the moral point of view, how we ought to act and think when loving other people, it fails to provide a complete account of love, crucially leaving out certain key elements from the wide range of loving relationships we find ourselves in, especially romantic love. That is, while Kantian moral love might successfully identify a morally ideal way to love other people, it falls short of capturing the full essence of love—mainly because love is not simply a moral affair but also a matter of the heart. (shrink)

*Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize*: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts of conscience – and why?’. By contrast, a (...) third important topic – the Conduct Question, i.e., ‘How should we act, morally speaking, when engaging in acts of conscience?’ – has been mostly neglected. This paper aims to offer concrete guidance for persons wishing to engage in acts of conscience in morally virtuous ways. I argue that such agents are subject to two basic prima facie duties: duties to oneself related to demands of integrity and duties to others related to demands of civility. I explain both duties in detail, arguing with regard to, that in light of what I call ‘the paradox of conscience’, we need to rethink our views about both ‘conscience’ and ‘integrity’; and with regard to, that, building upon Rawls’ ‘duty of civility’, we should embrace at least seven general principles for undertaking acts of conscience in a morally conscientious manner. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provides neither necessary nor (...) sufficient conditions for the justification of our moral beliefs and (2) help ethical intuitionism to deal with the fundamental problem of peer disagreement over our basic moral intuitions. In doing so, I sketch out a novel and attractive diachronic way of thinking about peer disagreement more generally. (shrink)

Este artículo es un intento de dilucidación y delimitación historiográfico-conceptual que pretende aportar un enfoque alternativo a los estudios sobre la teoría política realista. Mi propósito es presentar un bosquejo del sentido histórico del concepto de realismo político situándolo en los contextos de la Realpolitik alemana y de la escuela realista de las relaciones internacionales. De este modo, pretendo mostrar las relaciones contextuales del realismo político, la localización de su antagonismo con el liberalismo y la invención retrospectiva de una tradición (...) realista como resultado de una serie de apropiaciones intelectuales y políticas. This article is a historiographical and conceptual attempt of clarification and delimitation to offer an alternative view to the studies of the realist political theory. I pretend to put forward an outline of the historical sense of the concept of political realism, placing it on the contexts of German Realpolitik and the realist school of international relations. Thus, I pretend to show the contextual relations of political realism, the location of its antagonism against liberalism and the retrospective invention of a realist tradition as a result of a set of intellectual and political additions. (shrink)

The computer has three fundamental analogies with the human being (senses, memory and intelligence), but the coming out of the data bases announced a new form of language: the computer language. The data bases not only set several new technical and social problems, but moreover are modifying the traditional form of social memory, supported by paper, by changing it in a memory based on electronic means. This situation creates new forms of representation of knowledge to which the author gave attention (...) in previous contributions with his SENECA project, in which computer language tries to give a synthesis of oral and written languages, with their respective advantages. (shrink)

On the traditional view, Butler maintains that forgiveness involves a kind of “conversion experience” in which we must forswear or let go of our resentment against wrongdoers. Against this reading, I argue that Butler never demands that we forswear resentment but only that we be resentful in the right kind of way. That is, he insists that we should be virtuously resentful, avoiding both too much resentment exhibited by the vices of malice and revenge and too little resentment where we (...) merely condone the wrongdoer and leave ourselves open to future injury. I argue that this Butlerian approach offers us a more attractive account of forgiveness as a “virtue” than many recent discussions. In the final section, I address Butler’s challenging thesis that forgiveness is an unconditional moral duty. I argue against those who claim that forgiveness is supererogatory (Kolnai/Calhoun) or else merely morally conditional and even morally blameworthy in some cases (Murphy/Hampton/Novitz/Richards). By contrast, I defend a context-sensitive account of forgiveness which recognizes that it takes place on many different levels. I conclude by taking up the difficult issue of whether anybody can be ultimately “unforgivable”, offering some Butlerian and Strawsonian reflections that might help mitigate our judgments about such matters. (shrink)

Kant’s metaphilosophy has three main parts: (1) an essentialist project (“What is philosophy?”); (2) a methodological project (“How do we do philosophy?”); and (3) a taxonomic project (“What are the different parts of philosophy, and how are they related?”). This paper focuses on the third project. In particular, it explores one of the most intriguing yet puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy, viz. the relationship between what Kant calls ‘pure’ philosophy vs. ‘applied’, ‘empirical’ or what we can broadly refer to as (...) ‘impure’ philosophy. (As we shall see, in order to be able to address this third project, we shall also need to examine the other two projects in detail.) My plan is as follows. First, I discuss four main areas of pure vs. impure philosophy: (i) ‘pure logic’ vs. ‘applied logic’; (ii) ‘rational psychology’ vs. ‘empirical psychology’; (iii) ‘pure metaphysics of nature’ vs. ‘physics’ and (iv) ‘pure morality’ or a ‘metaphysics of morals’ vs. ‘moral anthropology’, ‘practical anthropology’ or ‘applied moral philosophy’. Based on this, I identify four key differences between pure and impure philosophy. Second, I critically examine four different readings of Kant’s views about the status of ‘impure’ philosophy: (a) that it is not genuine philosophy; (b) that it is bad or inferior philosophy; (c) that it is instrumentally valuable; and (d) that it constitutes an indispensable part of Kant’s philosophy, both in a theoretical and practical sense. I argue that Kant is best interpreted as endorsing readings (c) and (d). Third, I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

El trabajo cuestiona críticamente cierta visión extrema y unilateral apreciable en Adorno y Horkheimer al juzgar la relación de la industria cultural con la música. Es cierto que hoy prácticamente toda actividad humana se encuentra condiciona¬da por el mercado y que la música no es una excepción. Ella también es portadora de valor de cambio que tiende a ser dominante en los marcos de la industrial cultural. Pero es plausible que dentro de las industrias culturales mismas se empezara a hacer (...) una distinción entre los bienes culturales producidos por razones meramente comerciales y aquellos producidos por razones más artísticas. Un público demandante de obras de valor artístico, aun cuando pueda ser minoritario y estar inmerso también él en el mercado, condiciona de cierta manera la propia producción cultural, o, al menos, un segmento de ella. Esta posibilidad real no era muy reconocida por los autores de la “La industria cultural”. Según su lógica, como nada puede sustraerse a la industria cultural y como ésta compulsa a la prevalencia del valor de cambio o comercial y a la casi supresión de cualquier otro valor, entonces el arte, el verdadero arte, terminaría por desaparecer, sucumbiendo ante una lógica no interesada en su conservación o crecimiento, sino sólo en la maximización de ganancias a toda costa. Los hechos han contradicho esta conclusión. La relación de la música con la industria cultural, igual que las monedas, tiene dos caras. No basta con reconocer sólo la parte negativa, la que busca alienar las obras con tal de convertirlas en sólo mercancías. Es imprescindible tomar en cuenta también la posibilidad más que comprobable de que piezas con excelente factura estética surjan también en los marcos de esta industria. El asunto radicaría en develar las condiciones que lo posibilitan. El mercado, si bien puede favorecer la generación de productos pseudoculturales de escaso o nulo valor artístico, también se constituye en la única vía, dentro de la sociedad de consumo, por medio de la cual lo genuinamente valioso se convierte en patrimonio común. (shrink)

La comunicación de la verdad ética pasa históricamente por modelos, pero sus propuestas se discuten cuando no favorecen la belleza ética en la persona.El estudio refleja un análisis a modelos éticos en la cultura, para proponer la importancia de enfocar la educación ética valorando los paradigmas de una ética integradora y practica en un currículo global.Se infiere por el relativismo, una dialéctica que permanece sobre las certezas éticas; sobre lo justo, lo bueno, lo verdadero; sobre lo legal y lo ético; (...) para continuar divulgándose un discurso ético no de tipo vinculante, sin despertar pasión por la verdad. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of authenticity, both what it is and why it’s valuable. First, I identify and criticize three popular approaches to authenticity: Individual Authenticity, Natural Authenticity, and Truthful Authenticity. Second, I defend a fourth approach to authenticity – what I call Existential Authenticity (EA) – which is comprised of three basic elements: (a) self- understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern – in particular, concern about what kind of person one is and what type of life one lead. (...) Third, I explore why EA is valuable in both instrumental and non-instrumental ways. (shrink)

Is there any interesting sense in which we can speak of an act as 'evil', in contrast to simply "morally bad' or "immoral"? In ordinary language, we typically judge actions as evil that somehow differ significantly, in terms of degree or intensity, from commonplace wrongdoing. If taken to an extreme, however, this view simply reduces the difference between evil and immoral acts to a mere quantitative analysis. At worst, it leads to a wholly trivial account of evil as just those (...) actions we tend to regard as "really bad". In this paper, I outline a distinctively Kantian theory of evil that instead defends a fundamental qualitative difference between evil and more ordinary immoral actions, locating the main distinction in terms of the structure of the agent's will itself Broadly understood, this strategy endorses a Kantian account of "evil as dehumanization" in which a "material" -- as opposed to purely "formal" -- difference exists between the respective maxims of the immoral and the evil agent. In such instances, unlike typical cases of Kantian immoral actions, direct violation of another person's humanity qua human somehow comprises a necessary part of the "material object" of an evil agent's will. (shrink)

This chapter discusses fundamental problems and prospects for ethical naturalism. Section 1 explains what is meant by “ethical naturalism” and surveys different versions of the view. Section 2 discusses the central philosophical challenge to ethical naturalism, viz., the “Normativity Objection.” Section 3 offers a battery of responses to it on behalf of the ethical naturalist. Section 4 explores a promising and novel approach to ethical naturalism, viz., a moral nativist theory that that combines a Chomskian approach to moral competence with (...) a structuralist metaphysics. (shrink)

*Honorable Mention for the 2024 American Association of Philosophy Teachers (AAPT) Lenssen Prize*: In recent years, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ [PWOL] courses have emerged as an exciting new pedagogical approach. I explain what a PWOL-course is. Next, I argue that the standard method for teaching such courses—what I call the ‘Smorgasbord Model’—presents us with a basic problem: viz., the challenge of how to enable students in the context of the modern university to truly experience what a PWOL even (...) is. I propose a solution to this problem by exploring a PWOL that most teachers and students alike already find themselves immersed in, what I describe as political liberalism applied to the university classroom context. I show how this overlooked fact not only offers us a novel resource for teaching PWOL-courses. It also helps philosophy teachers—in a meta-pedagogical sense—to become more self-reflective about and appreciative of our fundamental ethical commitments when teaching philosophy. (shrink)

En este ensayo abordo la cuestión metafilosófica del concepto de filosofía política. Tras el análisis de algunas alternativas, reconstruyo críticamente la estrategia de conceptualización de Leo Strauss para mostrar su potencial heurístico en el desarrollo de una tipología de la filosofía política. El ensayo se dividirá en tres partes: primero, expongo el problema y analizo algunas alternativas que considero insuficientes para tratar de definir la filosofía política; después, presento la estrategia straussiana de conceptualizarla a partir de la interpretación del significado (...) original de la philosophia; al final, analizo cuatro tipos de filosofía política que identifico en la obra de Strauss y propongo otros dos que se fundamentan en sus propios supuestos. Concluyo señalando la utilidad de esas acepciones como modelos conceptuales para la interpretación, la consideración y la orientación de una filosofía política. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new framework for the general internalism/externalism debate about reasons. My aim is to defend a novel account of internalism that at least allows for the possibility of a more "realist" conception of reasons- thus avoiding simply begging the question (as Williams himself seems to do) against many recent externalist thinkers like Hampton, Scanlon, McDowell, and Parfit - while still somehow retaining a deep connection between reasons to act and an agent's motivations. What is crucial (...) to observe here is that Williams' intemalism relies upon two logically independent premises: on the one hand, a negative "skeptical" thesis denying we have any reason to believe that values - and the reasons associated with them - exist in any realist way independent of individual agents; and on the other hand, a positive "subjectivist" thesis controversially maintaining that all reasons for action are instead in some sense necessarily related to each particular agent's subjective motivations. I think we should reject Williams' widely-disputed "subjectivist" thesis. Rather, by endorsing only Williams' former premise, we are able to formulate a more modest "skeptical" version of intemalism – or what I call ‘skeptical internalism’ – which, unlike Williams' explicitly "subjectivist intemalism", at least allows for the externalist view that values exist in a realist way totally independent of us. We suspend judgment, however, about whether any such values do exist - where significantly, an individual agent's motivations somehow play a constitutive role in terms of assessing what values she even has reason to affirm. Such so-called "skeptical internalism" has several advantages over Williams' own view. As we will see, it not only helps usto bypass the current terminological deadlock, but also allows us to better focus upon what may be the most crucial difference between internalism and extemalism, which rests not so much in how each camp chooses to define what a reason is, but rather in how they understand the nature of rational disagreement itself. This specific worry constitutes perhaps the main crux of the entire intemalist/extemalist debate, and I argue that, in the end, skeptical internalism provides a much more satisfying analysis of the underlying ethical import of such rational disagreement than either of its two main rivals, extemalism or Williams' own subjectivist accountof internalism. (shrink)

Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, found in Kant’s discussion (...) of public heteronomy perpetuated by unjust social institutions. Second, I explore Kant’s idea of public dignity realized via social interaction: both (1) at the interpersonal level of education and friendship, and (2) at the societal level, in terms of moral education in the public sphere and a communal moral striving towards the highest good. I argue that we cannot realize our full human dignity for Kant outside of the context of concrete social relations with other moral agents. (shrink)

The computer has three fundamental analogies with the human being (senses, memory and intelligence), but the coming out of the data bases announced a new form of language: the computer language. The data bases not only set several new technical and social problems, but moreover are modifying the traditional form of social memory, supported by paper, by changing it in a memory based on electronic means. This situation creates new forms of representation of knowledge to which the author gave attention (...) in previous contributions with his SENECA project, in which computer language tries to give a synthesis of oral and written languages, with their respective advantages. (shrink)

Este artículo es un estudio comparativo de la manera en que Aristóteles y Alexis de Tocqueville conciben a la familia dentro del contexto de la democracia antigua y moderna, respectivamente. Se elabora un recorrido por la institución de la familia y el matrimonio en Grecia y Roma, y sus vinculaciones con las ideas políticas de esas civilizaciones. Igualmente, se contrasta el entendimiento antiguo de la democracia con el de Tocqueville, y se analiza la vinculación que éste estableció entre el hogar (...) y la esfera pública en las democracias modernas. (shrink)

Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, found in Kant’s discussion (...) of public heteronomy perpetuated by unjust social institutions. Second, I explore Kant’s idea of public dignity realized via social interaction: both (1) at the interpersonal level of education and friendship, and (2) at the societal level, in terms of moral education in the public sphere and a communal moral striving towards the highest good. I argue that we cannot realize our full human dignity for Kant outside of the context of concrete social relations with other moral agents. (shrink)

Luego de las campañas militares que el Estado argentino emprende contra los pueblos indígenas en la Patagonia y el Gran Chaco, a fines del siglo XIX cobra importancia el problema de qué hacer con los indígenas desplazados de sus tierras. En este contexto emerge la propuesta de aculturación del indígena a través de reducciones civiles, que en Argentina tiene como principal impulsor a Enrique Lynch Arribálzaga, fundador de la Reducción de Napalpí en 1911 y encargado de supervisar la misma entre (...) 1912 y 1917. El modelo de reducciones civiles confronta con las misiones religiosas, de larga tradición en América, y con diferentes alternativas de colonias civiles y militares, resultando el proyecto más favorecido en cuanto al financiamiento estatal. En este artículo, nos enfocamos en las tensiones y ambigüedades que se encuentran en la imagen del indígena que sostiene el autor como también en las cambiantes posiciones que su gestión despierta en la sociedad chaqueña, para lo cual analizamos el periódico El Colono, principal diario de Resistencia a principios del siglo XX. Investigamos de qué manera se posicionan los diferentes actores de la sociedad chaqueña ante las discusiones y proyectos en torno a los indígenas de la región, los puntos principales de conflicto y las representaciones con las que discurre la disputa en torno al lugar –simbólico y real- de los indígenas chaqueños. (shrink)

Online crowdsourcing platforms have rapidly become a popular source of data collection. Despite the various advantages these platforms offer, there are substantial concerns regarding not only data validity issues, but also the ethical, societal, and global ramifications arising from the prevalent use of online crowdsourcing platforms. This paper seeks to expand the dialogue by examining both the “internal” aspects of crowdsourcing research practices, such as data quality issues, reporting transparency, and fair compensation, and the “external” aspects, in terms of how (...) the widespread use of crowdsourcing data collection shapes the nature of scientific communities and our society in general. Online participants in research studies are informal workers who provide labor in exchange for remuneration. The paper thus highlights the need for researchers to consider the markedly different political, economic, and socio-cultural characteristics of the Global North and the Global South when undertaking crowdsourcing research involving an international sample; such consideration is crucial for both increasing research validity and mitigating societal inequities. We encourage researchers to scrutinize the value systems underlying this popular data collection research method and its associated ethical, societal, and global ramifications, as well as provide a set of recommendations regarding the use of crowdsourcing platforms. (shrink)

Este repertorio registra los artículos sobre Platón que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el primer semestre del año 2000.

The objective of this work is to establish a relationship between the cutting time in rocks, determining a speed and the point load strength index test, Is, to characterize the rock in terms of resistance and avoid sending samples to laboratories. As a first stage, on andesite samples, 5 x 5 x 10 cm test tubes were made. After the elaboration they were subjected to cutting, using an electric floor cutter and the time was evaluated. This cut was made in (...) a transversal way and two parts were obtained, one of them with dimensions 5 x 5 x 5 cm, approximately. In a third stage, the point load strength test was carried out in a press built for this purpose. Finally, the cutting speeds were correlated with the point load test values and only when rock samples do not pigeonhole on the proposed relationship, send them to the laboratory. Keywords: Mining fortification, uniaxial compressive strength, rock cutting, point load strength test index. References [1]P. Feijoo, R. Aucay, D. Ordoñez, "Aplicación del esclerómetro para la determinación de resistencia a compresión de rocas", presentado en el IV Congreso Internacional de Minería y Metalúrgia, Varadero, Cuba, 2018. [2]P. Feijoo y M. Román, «Correlación entre la Deformación y la Resistencia a la Compresión de rocas», uct, vol. 23, n.º 91, p. 6, may. 2019. [3]P. Feijoo, A. Bravo, N. Escandón, "Aplicación “UDAFORMIN” para la determinación del tipo de fortificación minera", presentado en el XII Congreso Iberoamericano de Computación para el Desarrollo, San Salvador, El Salvador, 2019. [4]P. Feijoo y C. Iñiguez, «Corte en las Rocas y su Relación con la Resistencia a Comprensión Simple», RISTI, n.º E 30, p. 59-67, jun. 2020. [5]P. Feijoo y J. Padrón, «La Resistividad de Rocas y su Relación con la Resistencia a Comprensión Simple en Mina», UCT, vol. 24, n.º 99, pp. 61-67, abr. 2020. [6]M. González. El terreno. Ediciones UPC. Barcelona. España, 2001. [7]E. Besoain. Mineralogía de Suelos. Turrialba: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas de la OEA, 1970. [8]P. Feijoo, A. Flores, B. Feijoo, "The Concept of the Granulometric Area and Its Relation with the Resistance to the Simple Compression of Rocks", presentado en la 7th International Engineering, Sciences and Technology Conference, Panamá, Panamá, 2019, pp. 52-56, doi: 10.1109/IESTEC46403.2019.00018. [9]F. Blyth. Geología para Ingenieros. Cecsa. México D. F. México, 2003. [10] E. Tarbuck & F. Lutgens. Ciencias de la Tierra: Una introducción a la Geología Física. Pearson. Madrid. España, 2005. [11]L. Suarez del Rio, A. Rodríguez, L. Calleja, V. Ruiz de Argandoña, «El corte de rocas ornamentales con discos diamantados: influencia de los factores propios del sistema de corte», CSIC, vol. 48, n.º 250, pp. 53-59, abr-mayjun 1998. [12]Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Explotaciones de Roca Ornamental. Diseño de explotaciones y selección de maquinaria y equipos. UPM. Madrid. España, 2007. [13]Catalog, Covington,. LAPIDARY & GLASS MACHINERY, USA. Retrieved from https://covington-engineering.com/content/pdf/Covington-Catalog.pdf. [14]D. Burbano, T. García, «Estimación empírica de la resistencia a compresión simple a partir del ensayo de carga puntual en rocas anisótropas », FIGEMPA, vol.1, n.º 2, pp. 13-16, dic. 2016. [15]P. Ramírez, L. de la Cuadra, R. Lain, E. Grigalbo. Mecánica de rocas aplicada a la minería metálica subterránea. Instituto Geológico Minero. Madrid. España, 1984. [16]P. Cordero, "Manual de prácticas de laboratorio de Mecánica de Rocas " tesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México D.F., México, 2019. [17]L. González de Vallejo, M. Ferrer. Manual de campo para la descripción y caracterización de macizos rocosos en afloramientos. Instituto Geológico y Minero de España. Madrid. España, 2007. [18]P. Pohjanpera, T. Wanne, E., Johansson. Point Load Test Results From Olkiluoto Area Borehole Cores. Posiva. Finlandia, 2005. [19]P. Ramírez, L. Alejano. Mecánica de rocas: fundamentos e ingeniería de taludes. Universidad Politécnica de Madrid. Madrid. España, 2004. [20]M. Navarrete, W. Martínez, E. Alonso, C. Lara, A. Bedolla, H. Chávez, D. Delgado, J. Arteaga. «Caracterización de propiedades físico-mecánicas de rocas ígneas utilizadas en obras de infraestructura», ALCONPANT, vol. 3, n.º 2, pp. 133-143, ago. 2013. [21]P. Feijoo, "Manual de mecánica de rocas y estabilidad de túneles y taludes" tesis, Universidad del Azuay, Cuenca, Ecuador, 1997. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa has proposed two different ways to respond to dreaming skepticism. In this paper I argue that Sosa's first response —which centers on holding that we have no beliefs in dreams— does not appear to be successful against either the hyperbolic or the realistic dreaming skeptic. I also argue that his second attempt to respond to the dreaming skeptic by arguing that perceptual knowledge indeed counts as what he calls "animal knowledge", may succeed but requires us to perform what (...) appears to be some radical surgery on the concept of knowledge; a radical surgery that, as I show, is probably unnecessary to avoid dreaming skepticism. Finally, I sketch some independent considerations why I think that the hyperbolic skeptic's dreaming argument is not acceptable. Ernesto Sosa propone dos maneras de responder al escéptico del sueño. En este ensayo argumento que su primera propuesta, según la cual no tenemos creencias en los sueños, no parece ser una buena respuesta en contra de ninguno de los escepticismos del sueño, de los cuales distingo dos tipos: el hiperbólico y el realista. También argumento que su segunda propuesta para responder al escéptico del sueño, en la que argumenta que el conocimiento perceptual sí cuenta como conocimiento animal, quizá resulte exitosa; sin embargo, ésta requiere llevar a cabo una cirugía radical en el concepto de conocimiento; una cirugía que, como muestro, es probablemente innecesaria para evitar el escepticismo del sueño. Finalmente bosquejo algunas razones independientes por las cuales considero que el argumento del escéptico hiperbólico del sueño no es aceptable. (shrink)

El presente artículo plantea un análisis del sujeto revolucionario en Los condenados de la tierra de Frantz Fanon bajo la lente de las posteriores contribuciones teóricas de Antonio Negri y Ernesto Laclau a los modos y determinaciones de construcción de los sujetos políticos en general y a través de sus valoraciones de las tesis fanonianas en particular. En concreto, se argumentará que en Fanon se encuentran matizada y entrecruzadamente algunas de las consideraciones que permiten interpretar el sujeto político que (...) se alza en la lucha de liberación nacional, primero como un sujeto múltiple y espontáneo de características tangentes a la multitud negriana, y segundo como un sujeto articulado unificadamente en relación con el pueblo laclausiano que, eventualmente, acabará recalando en nuevas correspondencias exegéticas con Negri. Este cuerpo analítico será complementado con referencias a la postura divergente de Vladímir Lenin y de Rosa Luxemburgo en torno a la cuestión del espontaneísmo y la organización del sujeto revolucionario. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...) the light of claims of “thought insertion” in schizophrenic patients. The paper aims to defend a Shoemaker-like line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. Methodologically, the paper argues that to properly address these issues the all-inclusive term “thought” should be avoided, and specific types of thoughts countenanced. (shrink)

In this article, we shift the usual analytical attention of the GPN framework from lead firms to suppliers in the network and from production to IT services. Our focus is on how Indian IT suppliers embed in the Netherlands along the threefold characterization of societal, territorial and network embeddedness. We argue that Indian IT suppliers attempt to display societal embeddedness when they move to The Netherlands. Our findings reveal that the endeavour by Indian IT suppliers to territorially dis-embed from the (...) Dutch context is reinforced by their peripheral position in the network and their ability to offshore work in a bid to contain costs, in addition to the influence of client domination. Therefore, territorial embeddedness is considered to be secondary to societal embeddedness which is intertwined with client interest while neglecting the interest of other network members. Nonetheless, the inter-firm relationship is complex, given the tension between societal, territorial and network embeddedness. While preferring Indian IT suppliers because of their low pricing, Dutch clients also insist on compliance with the institutional context of the Netherlands especially when it comes to Dutch employees. This results in hybridization which means that Indian IT suppliers find ways to adhere to the institutional framework for Dutch nationals while simultaneously insulating Indian employees from the same. Consequently, a highly unfair segmented internal labour market develops, with Dutch nationals being treated more favourably as compared to Indian nationals. Nonetheless, to address these violations, Indian employees prefer individual strategies of resilience and rework rather than a collectivization response. (shrink)

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

¿Por qué construír al pueblo es la principal tarea de una política radical? -- Una ética del compromiso militante -- ¿Vida nuda o indeterminación social? -- ¿Puede la inmanencia explicar las luchas sociales? Crítica a Imperio.

De re or singular thoughts are, intuitively, those essentially or constitutively about a particular object or objects; any thought about different objects would be a different thought. How should a philosophical articulation or thematization of their nature look like? In spite of extended discussion of the issue since it was brought to the attention of the philosophical community in the late fifties by Quine (1956), we are far from having a plausible response. Discussing the matter in connection with the status (...) of the Kripkean category of the contingent a priori, Donnellan (1979) argued that what can be properly classified as knowable a priori about utterances like those involving ‘one meter’ or ‘Neptune’ famously proposed by Kripke (1980) cannot be the very same singular content that is contingent he distinguished to that end between knowing a true proposition expressed by an utterance, and knowing that an utterance expresses a true proposition. Evans (1979) replied that, for a very specific sort of cases involving “descriptive names”, a related proto-two-dimensionalist account should be preferred, on which it is not the singular contingent content, but rather a general descriptive one which is knowable a priori. In a series of papers, Robin Jeshion (2000, 2001) has recently attacked Donnellan's proposal, arguing in favour of the most straightforward interpretation of Kripke's claim: in the relevant cases, the very same singular content can be both contingent and knowable a priori. This paper appeals to a generalized version of two-dimensional semantics to advance an account of the Kripkean cases along the lines of Evans's, and argues that Jeshion's compelling arguments against Donnellan's view do not apply to this version. (shrink)